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Abstract
This paper generalizes the analysis of distributive conﬂict, politics, and growth devel-
oped by by Alesina-Rodrik (1994). We construct a heterogenous-agent framework in which
both growth and the distribution of wealth are endogenous. Due to adjustments in the
distribution of wealth, the composition of factor ownership across households equalizes in
the long run. This implies that the optimal tax rate is the same for all households and
equals the growth maximizing tax rate. Hence, there is no distributive conﬂict in the long
run. When the model is augmented with a non-political redistributive policy, the model
predicts that long run growth exhibits a negative monotonic relationship with respect to
this policy, i.e., a redistributive policy that leads to a more equitable wealth distribution
unambiguously reduces growth in the long run.
Keywords: Median Voter, Endogenous Growth, Wealth Distribution, Distribu-
tive Conflict, Redistributive Policy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D31 Personal Income
and Wealth Distribution; E62: Fiscal Policy; O40 Economic Growth; P16: Po-
litical Economy of Capitalism.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 1
1 Introduction
A burgeoning literature now documents the impact of wealth distribution on economic growth.1
In one class of models, the exogenous initial distribution of wealth engenders a balance of power
in which distributive conﬂict inﬂuences optimal policy choices in equilibrium (Bertola, 1993;
Perotti, 1993; Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Aghion & Howitt, 1998).
In these models, a greater level of inequality leads to voted policies which reﬂect a greater
demand for redistribution. In Alesina-Rodrik model for example, since the transfer is funded
by a tax on capital, a redistributive tax decreases the after-tax return to capital, discourages
investment, resulting in a lower equilibrium growth rate.
An alternative class of models links wealth distribution to economic growth when capital
markets are imperfect (Loury, 1981; Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Benabou,
1995; Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Aghion & Howitt, 1998). In these models, redistributive policies
that reduce investment inequality foster aggregate production by relaxing the credit constraints
imposed by imperfect capital markets. This raises growth in the long run.
The present paper relates to the former class of models just described. A common feature
of these models is that the distribution of wealth or factor ownership is exogenous or pre-
speciﬁed. For instance, the Alesina-Rodrik model starts with a given initial distribution of
labor and capital holding across households (agents) who are inﬁnitely lived. While there is
capital accumulation by all households however, there is no transitional dynamics and the ratio
of capital holding between any two households remains the same for all time periods and equal
to the intially speciﬁed ratio – i.e. the “distribution of factor ownership is time-invariant” (page
473). In this sense, wealth distribution is exogenous. Similarly, in Persson & Tabellini (1994),
1See Benabou (1995) and Aghion et. al. (1999) for an exhaustive survey of this literature.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 2
the young are born with a draw from a distribution of skills. However, income inequality across
the young – who constitute the voting population – remains the same over time, and equals
the exogenously speciﬁed distribution of skills.
This paper generalizes the pioneering papers by Alesina-Rodrik and Persson-Tabelini, es-
pecially the former, by developing a model of endogenous wealth and income inequality among
the voting population. Persson & Tabellini (1994, page 618) write: “... how income and dis-
tribution and economic growth are jointly determined in political equilibrium is not very well
understood.” Our model can be viewed as an attempt to seek some understanding of this com-
plex issue. Instead of inﬁnite life time as in Alesina-Rodrik, it assumes ﬁnite life time of agents
and this gives rise to transitional dynamics.2 The equilibrium tax rate, the economy’s growth
rate, as well as distribution of factor ownership all evolve endogenously, and, in the steady
state, they are independent of the initial conﬁgurations. Endogenous distribution opens up a
new array of related questions. For instance, we ask whether, starting from a given distribution
of factor ownership composition, to what value the composition converges to? Answering this
would indicate how far –if at all– political conﬂict over redistribution “conﬂicts” with overall
economic growth.
Our analysis yields results which, we believe, are interesting and seem to oﬀer many general
insights. We begin by considering a straightforward generalization of the A-R model that has
a single politically determined policy: namely, a capital income tax. A striking conclusion
emerges: starting from any given distribution of factor composition, the distribution becomes
degenerate in the long run.3 In other words, the distribution of factor composition converges
perfectly across households in the long run, i.e., capital holding bears the same proportion to
2As Drazen (2000, page 473) writes, ”One criticism of all these models is the lack of transitional dynamics.
This is dictated ... by the diﬃculty in solving for a simultaneous economic and political equilibrium...”.
3The distribution of wealth or income does not become degenerate.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 3
skills for all households. This implies that the optimal tax rates of all households (including the
median household) are the same and equal to the growth maximizing tax rate i.e. unanimity
holds. In this sense, there is no conﬂict between politics and growth. This is important
because it enables us to identify economies, in general, where redistributive politics may hamper
economic growth.
We then consider a non-political redistributive transfer policy in which a given proportion
of tax proceeds are transferred back to the household sector in a uniform lump-sum fashion.
We assume that the distribution of skills is skewed to the right, so that, compared to the mean
household, the median household is poorer and receives more of the transfer (proportionally).
Such a transfer enables the median household to accumulate more capital than otherwise. In
the long run, the median household’s capital-labor (or capital-skill) ratio becomes greater than
the mean. As a result, its most preferred capital tax rate is less than the growth-maximizing
tax rate. This implies that, unlike when there is no nonpolitical redistributive policy, complete
convergence does not hold, and distributive conﬂict reappears. But a more redistributive policy
in the form of a higher proportion of tax proceeds being transferred back to the household
sector implies, on one hand, a more equitable distribution (as one would expect), and, on the
other hand, a lower capital income tax and lower growth rate. Thus the standard positive
association between equity and growth is reversed. This, in a sense, resurrects the age-old
trade-oﬀ between growth and equity.
Finally, our model also predicts that a positive technology shock leads to higher growth as
well as a higher capital tax in the long run. This means that within a country – having a given
technology parameter – the growth rate and the capital tax rate may be negatively or positively
related (of which only one combination is the equilibrium one), but, across countries diﬀer-Growth and Endogenous Distribution 4
entiated on the basis of technology, the (cross-country) correlation between the equilibrium
growth rate and tax rate is positive.
What are the critical diﬀerences between Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Persson & Tabellini
(1994), and our model? First, because distribution is endogenous in our model, there is no
causal link from distribution to growth. This implies that one can only speak of an “associa-
tion” between the two. Given this, the relevant questions become: (a) how distribution and
growth are correlated along the transition path; and (b), how long-run growth and long-run
inequality respond to shocks in the basic parameters of an economy such as a positive shock
to technology. Second, in both the Alesina-Rodrik (A-R henceforth) and Persson-Tabellini
(P-T henceforth) models, there is only one redistributive policy, which is political. However,
the enactment of a policy based on the(ir) result that lesser inequality causes higher growth
implies the existence of a redistributive policy that is non-political. In our model, we explicitly
consider two redistributive policies, one political and the other non-political. We then pose the
question as to whether a more redistributive policy, that is not politically manipulable, leads to
higher long-run growth via adjustments in the policy that is politically manipulable. Finally,
while diﬀerences in skills is the primitive source of heterogeneity as in Persson & Tabellini, in
our model, the voting population holds labor as well as capital, and capital holdings grow.
Our model also contrasts with the existing literature relating the distribution of wealth to
long run growth that does not consider political economy. For instance, in Galor-Zaira (1993),
the initial distribution of wealth has an impact on long-run growth of output – leading to
multiple equilibria. In contrast, in our model, the long run growth of output and the long-
run distribution of wealth are independent of the initial distribution of wealth; instead, they
depend on basic parameters of the economy such as the distribution of innate skill across theGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 5
population, technology, as well as direct re-distributive policies. Hence long-run distribution is
endogenous, somewhat similar to Matsuyama (2000). However, the diﬀerence is that while in
Matsuyama (2000) there is no source of heterogeneity across households except for wealth and
thus complete equality of wealth is a possible long-run outcome, in our model the heterogeneity
in the distribution of innate skill implies that perfect equality cannot obtain in the long run.
In summary, compared to the existing literature, the novel features of our analysis are the
following:
1. Our model incorporates transtional dynamics. This permits short-run as well as long-run
characterization of inequality and growth. In particular, the distribution of factor ownership
composition changes from its initial conﬁguration and evolves endogenously.
2. Distribution, political equilibrium and growth are all simultaenously determined.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a basic model of endogenous distribution,
growth, and distributive conﬂict. Section 3 introduces a nonpolitical redistributive policy and
derives the aggregate implications from the introduction of the policy. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The population or the number of households in the economy is given. Each household is
endowed with one unit of labor which is inelastically supplied to the market. Households
are diﬀerentiated on the basis of a basic skill level, Lh, whose distribution is assumed to be
continuous on a ﬁnite support in R+. This distribution is pre-determined and constitutes
the source of basic heterogeneity in the model.4 No further assumption such as skewness
is necessary for the analysis of this section. For simplicity however, we assume that the
4Alternatively, we can interpret Lh as just labor time supplied by household h, its distribution being based
on how ‘lazy’ households are vis-a-vis one another.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 6
distribution of Lh is skewed to the right. This implies that, Lm, the median skill level, is less
than ¯ L, the mean skill level. It permits us, as will be seen later, to use the capital holding




h∈H Lhdh ≡ L,w h e r eH is the total number of households and L is the total endow-
ment of skill. For notational convenience, we normalize H =1 .T h u sL = ¯ L.
2.1 Production
A single good is produced in the economy. The production function follows Barro (1990) and
A-R:
Qt = A ¯ Kα
t G1−α
t ¯ L1−α, (1)
where Qt is aggregate output at time t, ¯ Kt denotes the mean/aggregate capital, Gt is a public-
infrastructure input and A>0 is an index of technology. Following the endogenous growth
literature, we interpret K as physical as well as human capital. Hence, α is the private return





which, as will be seen later, ensures that the net return to capital in equilibrium is positive.5
The input Gt is ﬁnanced by a (speciﬁc) tax on capital income.6 As in A-R, such capital-
5With a narrower interpretation of K as physical capital, it would be empirically implausible to assume
α>1/2, but it is not so when capital is interpreted more broadly as we do here. Further, according to Barro
and Salai-Martin (1995, page 38), even a value of alpha equal to 0.75 is quite reasonable.
6This is equivalent to a wealth tax.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 7
income taxation should be viewed broadly as a redistributive policy that, on one hand, reduces
the incentive to accumulate, and at the same time act as a transfer income to relatively unskilled
labor – in terms of improving the marginal product of labor through an increase in Gt (see
A-R, page 466).7
The government budget constraint is satisﬁed in all time periods, i.e.,
Gt = τt ¯ Kt. (2)
The competitive factor rewards are:
rt =˜ r(τt) ≡ αAτ1−α
t ¯ L1−α, (3)
wt = φ(τt) ¯ Kt, where φ(·) ≡ (1 − α)Aτ1−α
t ¯ L−α, (4)
where rt is the rent earned by capital and wt denotes the wage rate. Note that an increase
in τ enhances the marginal product of both factors. This constitutes the source of gain from
the tax to household income. Finally, as in A-R, without loss of generality, we let the rate of
capital depreciation be zero.
2.2 The Household’s Problem
Following Aghion and Bolton (1997), Picketty (1997), and Das (2000, 2001), we assume that
agents live for a single period.8 At the end of the period, a replica is born to each agent, and
agents pass on a bequest to their children. Households derive utility from consumption, Cht,
and the amount of the good bequested (at time t)t ot i m et +1 ,Kht+1. Production occurs in
7On page 471-472, they also provide examples of redistributive policies that act as a direct tax on capital.
8Since every one lives for one period, there is no time-inconsistency problem.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 8
the beginning of each period. Once production occurs, agents make consumption and bequest
decisions. Hence, the bequest can be interpreted as inherited capital, with capital deﬁned
before.
The utility function, U :  2
+ →  +, satisﬁes the standard properties, and, for the sake of




ht+1, 0 <β<1. The budget
constraint facing an agent h is given by
Cht + Kht+1 ≤ φ(τt) ¯ KtLh +[ 1+˜ r(τt) − τt]Kht. (5)
We assume that the skill level of a household does not change over time or generations, i.e.,
one can think of skill – or habit – as being 100% genetic. Thus, each household is identiﬁed
by a given Lh. There is no dynamic stochastic process governing the evolution of Lh.T h e
beneﬁt of this assumption is that it oﬀers considerable analytical tractability. The cost is that
it does not permit to say anything about social mobility. However, social mobility, although
an important problem in its own right, is not our focus.
The tax rate is already known when households make their consumption and bequest









φ(τt)Lh ¯ Kt +[ 1+˜ r(τt) − τt]Kht

, (7)
¯ Kt+1 = β

φ(τt)¯ L +[ 1+˜ r(τt) − τt]
 ¯ Kt. (8)
Substituting the Euler equation for consumption into the utility function yields
Uht = Constant · Kht+1. (9)
Finally, substituting equation (7) into equation (9) yields the household’s indirect utility func-
tion:
Vht = Constant ·{ φ(τt)Lh ¯ Kt +[ 1+˜ r(τt) − τt]Kht}. (10)
It is suﬃcient to note that for any value of ¯ Kt and Kht, the indirect utility is single
peaked with respect to τt. This implies that the median household’s optimal tax rate is also
the equilibrium tax rate under majority voting. However, before characterizing the prefered
tax rate of the median voter, we ﬁrst prove that the median household is unique – which
is an implication of our assumption that for any given h, Lh does not vary over time. The
invariance of the median voter’s identity over time ensures analytical tractability of our model
of endogenous distribution and politics.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 10
2.3 Household Ranking and Uniqueness of the Median Household




φ(·)(Lh/nht − ¯ L)
φ(·)¯ L +1+˜ r(·) − τt)

. (11)
We start by tracking the economy from an initial period in which the tax rate is exogenous















Here and onwards, we follow the convention of letting variables without the time subscript
denote their steady state values. The relation (12) implies that Kh/Lh is same for all h, i.e.
the ranking of households in terms of capital held and disposable income is the same in terms
of Lh. This ‘alignment’ of Kh with Lh in terms of ranking implies that the median household
is identiﬁed by the ranking of Lh only, i.e. by Lh = Lm.
Now suppose that the tax rate ‘becomes’ political and is determined by majority voting.
The economy goes oﬀ the steady state. However, irrespective of what the tax rate is, (7)
implies that the next period’s capital stock holding of household h also has the same ranking
as Lh. Further, this remains true for all successive time periods, oﬀ and on the steady state,
as long as the households do not face asymmetric skill or preference shocks so as to change
the initial ranking of households on the Lh scale. We assume away such shocks, which implies
that the median household’s identity is unchanged even though τ may change over time.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 11
2.4 Analysis of Optimal Tax
How does the optimal tax rate compare across the households? Given (10), since the indirect
utility of any particular household is single-peaked with respect to τt, the optimal tax for
household h is given by the ﬁrst order condition:9
φ (τt)Lh
nht
+[˜ r (τt) − 1] = 0. (13)
From this equation, we can regard the marginal cost (MC) of a tax increase on disposable
income as equal to 1, while the marginal beneﬁt (MB) of a tax increase on disposable income
(actually the MB/MC ratio) equal to φ (τt)Lh/nht +˜ r (τt). These are illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider two households: one is labor-rich and capital-poor and the other is labor-poor and
capital-rich, i.e., the ratio Lh/nht is more for the former. Notice that the MB of a tax increase
on disposable income is greater for the former. As a result, the optimal tax for the former
household is higher as shown (τ1 >τ 2) . Intuitively, a labor-rich-capital-poor household cares
less about net capital income than a labor-poor-capital-rich household. Hence, the optimal tax
rate is higher for the former.
Using the deﬁnitions of φ(·)a n d˜ r(·) function, the ﬁrst-order condition (13) yields the












Equation (14) implies that the most preferred tax rate for a particular household depends









τ 1 τ 2
Figure 1: Optimal Tax for Households with Different Factor Holding Composi-
tions
on the ratio of two ratios, namely, nht/(Lh/¯ L). From now on, unless speciﬁed otherwise, let
“relative” mean relative to the mean household. Thus τht is negatively related to the ratio of
its relative capital holding to its relative skill. The economy’s aggregate/mean capital stock
and skill matter, because they determine the (economy-wide) marginal products of capital and
labor. The individual capital holding and skill matter because they determine the individual
disposable income.
It follows that for any given household, τht is negatively related to nht. Also, note that the
optimal tax rate for any household is always positive. Moreover, this is bounded from below
by the tax rate which will be chosen if a household’s labor income were zero.10












where nmt is the relative capital holding of this household.
10This is equal to the tax rate which maximizes the after-tax return to capital, ˜ r(τt) − τt.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 13
2.5 Steady State
The dynamics of the economy is fundamentally described by (11) with h = m and τt equal
to τmt given by (15). The former governs the dynamics of the relative capital holding of the












That is, the median household’s composition of factor holdings is equal to that of the mean











In other words, compared to any given household, a more skilled household accumulates more
capital in the long run and there is complete convergence of capital-labor ratio holdings across
households in the steady state. This implies that every household’s preferred tax rate is the
same, i.e., there is unanimity in the long run. Moreover, this tax rate is equal to
τ =

A(1 − α)¯ L1−α	 1
α . (18)
To see this intuitively, note that in terms of the MB/MC and MC curves depicted in Figure 1,
each household’s MB/MC curve collapses to that of the mean household and its intersection
with the MC=1 line gives τ in equation (18). This does not happen in the A-R model because
factor ownership compositions are time-invariant and exogenously given.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 14
We note a technical point here. Using (18), the net return to capital, κ ≡ r−τ,i se q u a lt o
(2α−1)τ/(1−α), which may not positive for all α<1. This is where our regularity condition
(R1), i.e. α>1/2, comes in; it assures that κ>0.
Turning to the economy’s growth rate, deﬁne gt ≡ Kt/Kt−1, the growth rate at time t.
From (8), this implies that at any time t,
gt+1 = β[φ(τt)¯ L +1+˜ r(τt) − τt]=β(1 + A¯ L1−ατ1−α
t − τt). (19)
This shows a non-monotonic relationship between growth and the tax rate. On one hand, an
increase in τ increases the marginal products of labor and capital and thus tends to increase
disposable income. On the other hand, it lowers after-tax income. Hence, there is a trade-oﬀ
in the net eﬀect on disposable income, savings, and subsequently, capital accumulation, from
ar i s ei nτ. Moreover, similar to the A-R model, from (19) we see that there is a unique
growth-maximizing tax rate equal to
tg =

A(1 − α)¯ L1−α	 1
α . (20)
However, unlike in A-R, this is same as the equilibrium tax rate in the steady state given by
equation (18). Hence, long-run growth is maximized at the political equilibrium. It follows
from the convergence of capital-labor ratio holdings across households. This, we believe, is a
very interesting departure from the exogenous-distribution framework of A-R and P-T. We see
this as a useful bench-mark case where political equilibrium coincides with maximization of
growth. The beneﬁt of identifying this economic environment is that the ineﬃciency resulting
from politics in a more realistic economy can be seen insightfully in terms of a deviation fromGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 15
such an environment. Indeed in the next section, we examine such a deviation.
In terms of comparative statics, we note from (18) that dτ/dA > 0. This is because a
positive technology shock enhances the marginal product of both labor and capital and thus
raises the marginal gain from a tax increase. Hence, everyone’s preferred tax rate is higher.
However, the tax rate is independent of the preference parameter β. On the other hand,
from (19), the long-run growth rate is an increasing function of both A and β.A ni m p o r t a n t
corollary derived from the eﬀects of a technology shock is that the cross-country correlation
between the tax rate and the growth rate will be positive when countries are ranked in terms
of their levels of technology. This contrasts with an intra-country relationship between the tax
and growth rates, which may be negative or positive depending on the range of the tax rate.
We have not mentioned anything about inequality yet. Our assumption that Lm < ¯ L
implies that in the steady state, nm = Km/ ¯ K<1. Hence, we can take nm, the median-mean
wealth ratio, as the indicator of inequality, and, a higher nm implies a more equal distribution
of wealth. Note also that, along the steady state, a household’s disposable income and indirect
utility are both proportional to a household’s holding of capital. Hence, the magnitude of nm
would also indicate inequality in terms of income and utility. In other words, inequality in
terms of wealth, income and utility are synonymous in our model.
Further, we observe directly from (16) that the long run wealth inequality is the same as
the inequality in skill, i.e., more generally, the distribution of long-run wealth is the same as
that of the skill. Within the purview of the model this is only “natural.”11 Since the innate
skill distribution is exogenous, unlike the tax rate or the growth rate, the level of inequality is
not aﬀected, for example, by a technology shock.12
11If skill can be enhanced by education and there are capital market imperfections, then the distribution of
long-run wealth or income inequality will not be equal to that of the innate skill distribution.
12However, a uniform additive skill shock to all households would increase nm and lower inequality.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 16
More generally, we can deﬁne inequality in terms of coeﬃcient of variation.13 Note from
(17) that the standard deviation of Kh equals cL ¯ Kt,w h e r ecL is the coeﬃcient of variation
of Lh. Hence the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth is equal to cL, which is also invariant with
respect to a technology shock.
2.6 Comparing With the A-R Model
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison and reconciliation with the A-R model in a simple manner.
The non-monotonic relationship between the growth rate and the tax rate – given by equation
(19) – is depicted in the top panel. The tax rate that maximizes the aggregate/average welfare
is also the one that maximizes the growth rate. (This holds in the A-R model as well as in
Barro (1990).)
The bottom panel graphs equation (14): the optimal tax as a negative function of the
ratio of relative capital holding to relative skill. In the A-R model the median voter’s relative
capital holding is assumed to be less than its relative labor endowment, or, the relative skill
in terms of our model. Hence, ρm ≡ nm/(Lm/¯ L) < 1. Accordingly, the economy operates
eﬀectively in the right-hand side of the growth-maximizing tax rate. Suppose that initially
ρm = ρ0
m. The tax rate is read oﬀ the horizontal axis and the economy’s growth rate is g0.
Now, if ρm increases to ρ1
m, i.e., the distribution becomes more equitable, we see that the tax
rate falls and the economy’s growth rate jumps up to g1. This is the central proposition of the
A-R model. In contrast, in our model, the distribution is endogenous and every household’s
relative capital holding adjusts and converges in the steady state to its relative skill. That is,
ρh = 1, for all h, including the median household. There is unanimity in voting for the tax
rate. Political equilibrium implies the growth-maximizing tax rate, τg. This is an interesting
13Caselli and Ventura (1999) and Das (2000, 2001) also use this as the measure of inequality.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 17












L L n m m /









K K n h h / ≡
Our model: 1
Figure 2: Comparison between Alesina-Rodrik Model and Ours
2.7 Transitional Dynamics
Suppose there are skill shocks to households (without changing their ranking in terms of Lh)
such that initially the median voter’s relative capital holding is not equal to its steady state
value. How does the economy adjust over time? The transitional dynamics are governed by
equations (11) and (15). To address this issue, for simplicity, we conﬁne ourselves to dynamics
around the neighborhood of the steady state.
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (11) and evaluating the derivative by using the steady stateGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 18













1+˜ r(τ) − τ
φ(τ)¯ L +1+˜ r(τ) − τ
< 1. (21)
This implies that the transition path of inequality is monotonic and stable. Thus, starting
from nm0  = Lm/¯ L, the economy converges monotonically to the long run level of inequality
deﬁned by the basic source of heterogeneity in the model, Lh. Given the dynamics of nmt,t h e
dynamics of the tax rate are evident from (15). The optimal tax along the transition path
decreases or increases over time as nm0 ≶ Lm/¯ L ⇔ ρm ≶ 1.
How does the growth rate change during the transition periods? Interestingly, from Figure
2, we can readily infer that it increases over time – and tends to converge to the maximized
growth rate – irrespective of whether ρm0 ≶ Lm/¯ L initially.
In summary, the endogeneity of wealth distribution implies a conﬁguration of the long-run
growth rate, tax rate, and the degree of inequality, which is quite diﬀerent from the case where
the distribution of wealth is exogenous. Our model constitutes a bench-mark example in which
convergence in terms of composition of factor holdings occurs. Growth-maximizing tax rate
and hence maximized growth prevail at the political equilibrium. As comparative statics, a
(neutral) technology improvement leads to an increase in both the long-run tax rate and the
long-run growth rate, but does not aﬀect inequality. Furthermore, over the transition period,
the growth rate and inequality are positively or negatively related depending on whether the
initial level of inequality falls short of or exceeds its steady state level.
In what follows, we consider an important extension to our bench-mark model.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 19
3 Redistributive Policy and Redistributive Politics
The implicit but central message of the A-R model and the P-T model is that policies that
induce lesser inequality raise the long run growth rate of the economy as well. However,
their models do not contain any independent, exogenous policy instrument that can inﬂuence
distribution. In order to ascertain the impact of redistributive policies on growth, one must
then introduce a policy instrument which is not politically manipulable.
The simplest way to capture this within our framework is to assume that a fraction θ,
0 <θ<1, of tax revenues is disbursed uniformly across households. Speciﬁcally, while the
revenues generated are equal to τt ¯ Kt,ap o r t i o no fi t ,θτt ¯ Kt = Tt, is transferred back to the
households, and, (1−θ)τt ¯ Kt = Gt is used in production. The policy parameter θ is exogenous,
whereas τt is politically determined as before. While the former corresponds to a redistributive
policy, redistributive politics enters through the latter. We assume that Lm < ¯ L,s ot h a t
nmt < 1 and an increase in nmt would mean a more equitable distribution. We now ask how
an increase in θ aﬀects long-run growth. 14
Our main result here is that, along the steady state, while an increase in θ increases nm
and thus reduces inequality, it unambiguously reduces growth. Hence, the standard positive
link between equality and growth is completely reversed, and we are ‘back’ in the realm of an
equity-growth tradeoﬀ. We see this by observing that starting from the steady state in which
there is no non-political redistributive policy, and the relative capital endowment of the median
household is equal to its relative skill, a redistributive program makes the median household
relatively capital-rich. Hence, this household chooses a capital-income tax rate that is less
14It can be argued of course that in a real economy θ is political while τ is not. However, the political-economy
literature on taxation does not tell us which policy instruments are political and which are not. Assuming θ to
be non-political enables us to analyze the impact of a directly redistributive program on growth and distribution.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 20
than the growth-maximizing tax rate. Indeed, more of such redistribution makes the median
household more capital-rich (in relative terms) and induces it to lower its preferred tax rate.
This causes the growth rate to fall. In terms of Figure 2, the economy in the steady state
operates solely in the region that is on the left-hand side of τg.
To see this formally, let the aggregate production function be the same as before. Given
that Gt =( 1− θ)τtKt, the competitive factor rewards are:
rt =˜ r(τt)(1 − θ)1−α; wt = φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−α ¯ Kt, (22)
where ˜ r and φ are as deﬁned in the basic model. The household problem is modiﬁed to include







ht+1, subject to Cht + Kht+1 ≤ wtLh +( 1+rt − τt)Kht + Tt.
However, the same ﬁrst-order conditions obtain. Accordingly, the household-level and aggre-
gate capital accumulation equations are:
Kht+1 = β

φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−αLh ¯ Kt +[ 1+˜ r(τt)(1 − θ)1−α − τt]Kht + τtθ ¯ Kt

(23)
¯ Kt+1 = β

φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L +[ 1+˜ r(τt)(1 − θ)1−α − τt] ¯ Kt + τtθ ¯ Kt

, (24)
respectively. Finally, the following indirect utility function obtains:
Vht = Constant ·

φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−αLh ¯ Kt +[ 1+˜ r(τt)(1 − θ)1−α − τt]Kht + Tt

. (25)
We assume that individuals – in their calculation of the marginal beneﬁts from and theGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 21
marginal cost of τt – disregard the eﬀect of an increase in τt on total tax proceeds. Hence,
treating the term, Tt = τtθKt, as given, the maximization of indirect utility with respect to












As expected, the optimal tax for any household is a decreasing function of θ.





φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−α(Lh/nht − ¯ L)+θτt(1/nht − 1)




Since a uniform transfer maintains the ranking of households in terms of disposable income,
the median household’s identity remains unchanged as in the basic model. Substituting h = m,
from (26) and (27), the steady state conditions are:
τ =


















= θτα(1 − nm). (29)
These two equations determine the equilibrium τ and nm. From the ﬁrst equation, an increase
in nm reduces τ, as in the basic model. Additionally, for given nm,a ni n c r e a s ei nθ increases
the median household’s disposable income, which reduces its demand for τ. From the secondGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 22
equation, given Lm < ¯ L,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti fnm <L m/¯ L, then the l.h.s. of (29) is
negative and the r.h.s. is positive. The opposite holds if nm > 1. This implies
Lm
¯ L
<n m < 1. (30)
Thus, in contrast to the basic model, nm exceeds Lm/¯ L, i.e., the redistributive program implies
that long-run inequality is less. The diﬀerence between nm and Lm/¯ L can be interpreted as
excess equality, arising from the presence of the redistributive program. Formally, let ∆ denote





It is important to note that inequality (30) implies that the median household holds a higher
capital/skill ratio than the mean household. This occurs, while, in terms of basic endow-
ments, the median household is relatively skill-poor and capital-poor. Because the proportion
of transfers received relative to pre-transfer income is higher for the median than the mean
household, the median household’s relative capital accumulation is higher than in the absence
of the transfer program.
Also note that factor-composition convergence does not hold. This is because transfers are
uniformly disbursed, not proportional to pre-transfer income. However, there is an interval-
convergence, not point-convergence, in the sense that the standard deviation of the diﬀerence
between relative capital holding and relative skill across households is dictated by θ.T o s e e
this formally, note that, in general, for any household h in the steady state, its relative capitalGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 23
holding is determined by an equation analogous to (29), which is:






= θτα(1 − nh). (32)





θ[1 − ∆(1 − α)](1 − Lh/¯ L)
1+θ[1 − ∆(1 − α)]
. (33)
It is easy to see that the mean of nh −
Lh
¯ L is zero. Its standard deviation is equal to
σ(nh − Lh/¯ L)=
θ[1 − ∆(1 − α)]
1+θ[1 − ∆(1 − α)]
cL, (34)
where, as before, cL denotes the coeﬃcient of variation of skill distribution. In the special case
of θ =0 ,σ(·) reduces to zero. This means that, initially, oﬀ the steady state, the diﬀerence
nh − Lh/¯ L may be very widely dispersed, but as the economy moves to the steady state, the
standard deviation of this diﬀerence converges to a given value which is a function of the
magnitude of θ.
Since absolute convergence breaks down, the growth-maximizing rate does not coincide with
the median voter’s preferred tax rate in the long run. This implies that there is distributive
conﬂict in the presence of a nonpolitical redistributive policy.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 24
3.2 Comparative Statics
Return to equations (28) and (29). If we substitute the former into the latter and eliminate τ,
we have one equation in one variable, namely, nm:
θ =
nm − Lm/¯ L
α(1 − nm)+( 1− α)(1/nm − 1)Lm/¯ L
. (35)
Note that the r.h.s. is increasing in nm. Therefore, an increase in redistribution leads to a
decrease in long run inequality. However, agents being heterogenous with respect to the basic
skill parameter, a rise in θ does not completely eliminate inequality. Indeed, in the limit, when
θ =1 ,nm still remains bounded away from unity.15
How does an increase in θ aﬀect the long run tax rate? It falls for two reasons. Directly,
ar i s ei nθ bestows a positive wealth eﬀect on every household. Thus, it reduces the median
household’s ‘demand for τ’. Indirectly, the median household’s relative wealth, nm,i n c r e a s e s .
This also reduces its demand for τ. The latter eﬀect arises because wealth distribution is
endogenous.
We now deﬁne the eﬀective tax rate as Θt =( 1−θ)τt, which will be useful in understanding
the eﬀect of redistributive policy on growth. Note that an increase in θ leads to a decrease in Θ
via a decrease in τ for the two reasons described above. In addition, by deﬁnition, Θ decreases
as θ increases at any given τ.T h u s dΘ/dθ < 0 unambiguously. Turn now to equation (24),
15This result contrasts, for example, with the central implication of Saint-Paul & Verdier (1993), in which
although distribution is endogenous, income dispersion shrinks over time and the economy converges to full







Figure 3: Effective Tax Rate and the Long-Run Growth Rate
which implies
gt+1 = β[φ(τt)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L +1+˜ r(τt)(1 − θ)1−α − τt + θτt]
= β{A¯ L1−α[τt(1 − θ)]1−α +1− τt(1 − θ)}, using the deﬁnitions of φ(·)a n d˜ r(·)
= β[1 + A¯ L1−αΘ1−α
t − Θt]. (19 )
Observe that the same non-monotonic relationship holds between the growth rate and the tax
rate as in the basic model holds, except that it is the eﬀective tax rate here. This is exhibited
in the top panel of Figure 3. (Compared to Figure 2, only the scales are drawn diﬀerently.)
The bottom panel depicts the negative relationship between the eﬀective tax rate and the
redistributive policy parameter θ.
The eﬀect of an increase in θ on the long-run growth rate is seen immediately now. Note
that when θ =0 ,τ =Θ g, the growth-maximizing tax rate. Hence for any θ ∈ [0,1], Θ ≤ Θg,
and, thus the economy operates in the left-hand side of the “growth-tax” relationship. As θGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 26
increases, Θ falls and from the top panel we see that the growth rate decreases. Hence more
redistribution leads to a lower growth rate – which is in sharp contrast to A-R and P-T.16
3.3 Transitional Dynamics
As in the basic model, the dynamic adjustment path is stable and monotonic. This is proven
in Appendix 1. Thus, similar to the basic model, depending on whether nm0 ≷ nm, inequality
and the tax rate increase or decrease over time. However, since in the steady state the economy
is at a point along the left-hand arm of the growth-tax curve, the dynamics of the growth rate
are diﬀerent. Whereas in the basic model the growth rate would increase over time as long as
nm0  = nm, here, the growth rate increases or decreases depending on whether nm0 ≷ nm.
In what follows we examine the eﬀect of an increase in θ on the dynamics of inequality,
tax rate and growth rate. Assume that, initially, at t = 0, the economy is in the steady state
(i.e. nm = nm0), and, an unanticipated permanent increase in the policy parameter θ occurs.
Totally diﬀerentiating (27) for h = m, using the fact that initially, φ(τ0)(1 − θ)1−α(Lh/nm0 −
¯ L)+θτ0(1/nm0 −1) = 0, and substituting the expression of τ in (26), we get the expression of





(1 + κ0)x0/τ0 +1+θx0




Recall that κ is the net return to capital. Thus, in the short run also, an increase in θ reduces
inequality. Furthermore, it is proven in Appendix 2 that the magnitude of change is less than
16The implication is that an increase in θ reduces the long-run growth rate. Were θ introduced in the A-R
model with exogenous nm (<L m/¯ L), a part of the right-hand side of the growth-tax relationship would have
been relevant. Hence, starting from θ =0 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nθ would have initially increased the growth rate and
then reduced the growth rate beyond a critical point. However, distribution being endogenous in our model, a
higher θ lowers the growth rate unambiguously.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 27
that of the long-run eﬀect, as one would expect. However, unlike the long-run eﬀect, the
magnitude of the short run eﬀect is aﬀected by the technology parameter A.T os e et h i s ,n o t e
that from (36), the magnitude of dnm1/dθ is an increasing function of the original tax rate,
which, in turn, is an increasing function of the parameter A. Hence, the higher value of A,t h e






















Figure 4: Dynamics of Inequality, Tax Rate & Growth
Figure 4, panel (a), depicts how an unanticipated permanent rise in θ aﬀects the dynamics of
inequality: there is initially a discrete downward jump in inequality (nm1 increases), followed
by a gradual convergence to the new steady state. The tax rate falls in period 0 itself as
∂τt/∂θ < 0. With nmt increasing over time from period 1, the tax rate continues to fall over
time. The dynamics of the growth rate follows directly from that of the tax rate: it decreasesGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 28
over time. These are depicted in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 4.
4 Summary
This paper has attempted to formulate a framework which results in the joint determination of
inequality and growth in a political equilibrium. There is a unique non-degenerate distribution
of wealth and income in the steady state, which follows from the diﬀerence in the innate ability
of individuals. In this respect, our model is similar to Caselli and Ventura (1999). In terms of
the political equilibrium, our model follows the median-voter approach of Alesina-Rodrik and
Persson-Tabellini. More speciﬁcally, the model is closer to the A-R model in that the politics
is conﬁned to tax on capital income.
We ﬁnd that the endogeneity of distribution oﬀers novel insights. In the absence of any
exogenous redistributive program, the factor-holding ratios across households converge in the
long run. Every agent is a representative agent in the political arena. Unanimity holds and
the growth-maximizing tax rate is chosen. Thus, there is no distributive conﬂict.
In contrast, with an inequality-reducing nonpolitical transfer policy in place, the composi-
tion of factor holdings does not converge. However, there is interval-convergence in the sense
that the dispersion of factor-holding composition is “bounded” by the magnitude of the trans-
fer policy. Political equilibrium does not lead to the choice of a growth-maximizing eﬀective
tax rate. Moreover, in contrast to the A-R model, it is less than the growth-maximizing tax
rate, since the median household’s capital-skill ratio exceeds that of the mean household. This
implies, in stark contrast to A-R, that a more equitable transfer policy unambiguously lowers
long-run growth.
Although the model of the paper is speciﬁc, an ‘example’ so-to-speak, it seems to oﬀer a fewGrowth and Endogenous Distribution 29
general insights. First, it suggests that long-run dynamic adjustments of wealth and income
distribution engender ‘greater’ political consensus over policy choices. Second, we ﬁnd that
a non-political tax-transfer policy that leads to a more equitable distribution hurts long-run
growth. Most of all, the model hopes to prove a general point that the joint analytical determi-
nation of inequality, growth, and a political equilibrium is not an intractable proposition. The
speciﬁc model achieves tractability by assuming limited life time and an economy in which the
identity of the median household does not change over time. Hopefully, for future research,
this approach would suggest other ways to ensure tractability in similar models and at the
same time oﬀer more generality. For example, what happens when individuals vote on a tax
schedule rather than a tax rate. Also, there are several sources of individual heterogeneity.
We have considered innate-skill heterogeneity, so as to illustrate the contrast with the existing
literature as sharply as possible. Other sources of heteroneity such as various types individual
preference shocks should be considered and their implications toward long-run distribution and
growth be systematically studied.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 30
Appendix 1
We prove that the dynamic adjustment path of nmt, as given in (27) for h = m, is stable and
monotonic.
We begin with some preliminaries. From the deﬁnition of φ(·) and using (28), we obtain
the steady state relationship:











nm − Lm/¯ L
1 − nm
. (A2)
The last two relations imply
θτ = φ(·)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L
nm − Lm
1 − nm





= φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L + θτ. (A3)







, where µ ≡
(1 − α)Lm
(1 − α)Lm + αnm¯ L
< 1 − α. (A4)
We now return to the dynamic equation (27) for h = m. Diﬀerentiating it with respect to





φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−αLm/nm + θτ/nm
φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L +1+κ + θτ
+
φ (τ)(1 − θ)1−α(Lm/nm − ¯ L)+θ(1/nm − 1)





1+κ − φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−αµ(¯ L − Lm/nm)
φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−α¯ L +1+κ + θτ
, (A5)
using (A3), (A4), (29) and that φ  =( 1− α)φ/τ.
Notice that the magnitude of the numerator of (A5) is less than the denominator. Hence
|dnmt+1/dnmt| < 1 and the dynamic path is stable.
We prove next that the numerator of (A5) is positive. We have
κ =˜ r(τ)(1 − θ)1−α − τ = τ
α − (1 − α)x
(1 − α)x
φ(τ)(1 − θ)1−αµ(¯ L − Lm/nm)=τ








nm¯ L + α, and, we have made use of (28) and the deﬁnition of φ. Hence the
numerator of (A5) equals
1+
τ[α − (1 − α)x − µ(1 − x)]
(1 − α)x
> 1
since α>1 − α>µand 0 <x<1. The denominator of (A5) is then obviously positive.
Hence dnmt+1/dnmt > 0, implying that the adjustment path is monotonic.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 32
Appendix 2
It is proven that dnm/dθ|short run <d n m/dθ|long run. Note ﬁrst that the equation (35) can be
expressed as
θ =
nm − Lm/¯ L
(1 − nm)x0
. (35 )





nm0 − Lm/¯ L
κ0x0/τ0 +1+θx0
> 0. (A6)
This expression will be compared with the long-run eﬀect.



















nm − Lm/¯ L
1+θ[α +( x0 − α)/nm]
(A7)
In obtaining the last expression we have made use of (35 ) and the deﬁnition of x0.























The l.h.s. is equal to 1/τ0 + α/[(1 − α)x0] − 1, which exceeds 1/x0 − 1 under the regularity
condition (R1). The r.h.s. is obviously less than 1/x0 − 1 and hence less than the l.h.s.,
implying that the short-run eﬀect is smaller in magnitude.Growth and Endogenous Distribution 33
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